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Abstract
We address the problem of locking and unlocking a
device, such as a laptop, a phone or a security token,
based on the absence or presence of the user. We detect
user presence by sensing the proximity of a subset of their
possessions, making the process automatic and effortless.
As in previous work, a master key unlocks the device and a
secret-sharing scheme allows us to reconstruct this master
key in the presence of k-out-of-n items. We extend this
basic scheme in various directions, e.g. by allowing items
to issue a dynamically variable number of shares based on
how confident they are that the user is present. The
position we argue in this paper is that a multi-dimensional
approach to authentication that fuses several contextual
inputs, similar to that already adopted by major web sites,
can also bring advantages at the local scale.
Introduction
At major web sites, user authentication is already evolving
from a boolean evaluation of “password correct /
incorrect” to a multi-dimensional approach based on
machine learning, in which several contextual inputs are
fused to produce a continuous-valued confidence level [2].
The position we argue in this paper is that we can
fruitfully apply variations of this strategy at local scale
too, to decide when to lock and unlock a laptop, a
smartphone, or even—somewhat recursively—an
authentication token. Our approach relieves the user from
having to memorise secrets and offers the benefit of
continuous authentication.
Previous work by Desmedt et al [3], Peeters et al [8], and
ourselves [11, 12] has discussed splitting a master
unlocking secret into shares held by devices owned by a
user. We present several new ideas that enhance and
extend the basic model: dynamically weighted shares,
negative shares and hierarchies of shares. These variations
allow us to assign a more accurate rating to the
trustworthiness of the contextual hint supplied by each
device, thereby enhancing security while retaining better
usability than traditional unlocking methods such as
passwords and PINs.
Background
Establishing that a specific, conscious and approving user
is present and is requesting authorisation for a particular
action has traditionally involved testing for something you
know, something you have or something you are. Greater
security is often achieved by combining tests from more
than one of these categories. However, each test incurs a
cost, be it one of finance, inconvenience, privacy loss, or
simple taxing of the memory. If the well-known and
increasing problems with passwords make it less desirable
to depend on something you know, and if the privacy,
accuracy and convenience concerns about biometrics
make it difficult to establish something you are, then it is
worth exploring whether something you have, and the
particular context in which you have it, may now usefully
play a larger role in computer security, as it does in other
parts of life.
The things we carry in a given context already enable us
to perform many actions that other people could not. The
obvious examples are key-rings, wallets, purses, and
smartphones, but other possessions can also play a role:
the wearing of particular items of clothing may be
required to secure entrance to a formal restaurant, for
example, and carrying a major credit card will help ensure
a trouble-free exit afterwards. In many countries, if you
wish to ride a motorbike on the public highway, you need
a helmet and a particular piece of paper, as well the
ignition key.
Some of these items, such as keys, may be an absolute
requirement if you are to perform an action at all, while
others simply increase the likelihood that society will
consider the action to be legitimate. The wider context is
also important: carrying your front door key will not
authorise you to ride your motorbike. Wearing a
motorbike helmet is highly unlikely to help you gain
entrance to the formal restaurant, and might positively
bar you from entrance to a bank. The possession of
objects which are a positive indicator in one context may
be counted negatively in another.
In the past, computer systems have been poorly equipped
to detect the items that a user may be carrying with
them, but the wide deployment of cameras,
accelerometers and similar sensors, and of low-power radio
systems, makes this approach increasingly viable.
The Pico Project:
A testbed for ‘something you have’
The Pico project [12] is an interesting case study that
tries to take the concept to the next stage: eliminating
the need for passwords altogether, and relying solely on
devices that the user carries with them. We provide a brief
overview here; the project is described in detail elsewhere
[12, 4, 13] and the original paper discusses related work.
The user’s credentials are stored on the Pico device. The
user scans the barcode of a service provider with their
Pico to indicate their intention to perform an action (such
as logging in to a web site, or making a payment). The
Pico then uses the appropriate stored credentials to inform
the service provider, over a secure channel, that the user
has requested the action, which the provider can then
authorise, for example by causing the the user’s browser
session to be logged in. In the case of an ongoing session,
the Pico also provides continuous authentication:
maintaining the session while the Pico is present, and
closing it automatically as soon as the Pico is absent.
Possession of the Pico device alone, however, is insufficient
to indicate which user currently possesses it. The Pico
therefore relies on the proximity of partner devices known
as ‘Picosiblings’, which may be items of jewellery,
wristwatches, phones, key fobs, RFID tags in clothing, and
so forth — items likely to be more closely attached to the
user. The proximity to the Pico of a significant number of
these greatly increases the likelihood that the user who
possesses them is also present, and that the Pico has not
been lost or stolen; you might leave your Pico on the seat
of your taxi, but the situations in which you might
simultaneously leave your earrings and your shoes there
are much fewer. To use a Pico, then, you must also be in
possession of several associated, nearby Picosiblings.
From a user’s perspective, the Pico may be thought to
have a ‘comfort zone’, in which it feels secure enough to
give up its secrets. In fact, the Pico does not simply make
a decision whether or not to authorise an action: it is
actually incapable of doing so in the Picosiblings’ absence,
since they each possess part of the key needed to unlock
those same credentials. This is an approach previously
used by, for example, Desmedt et al [3]. A secret-sharing
algorithm, such as that of Shamir [10] or Blakley [1], can
ensure that, although a user may possess n Picosiblings,
at least k of them must be present for the Pico to be able
to act. The Pico deletes the credentials from its working
memory after using them, so k Picosiblings will be
required again for recreating the master secret the next
time.
Perhaps because of its simplicity, the secret-sharing
concept is very powerful, and the basic k-of-n model for
Picosiblings can be extended in a number of ways to
model human behaviour more closely. The enhancements
proposed below apply to many systems, and could be used
to unlock many other kinds of devices, not just a security
token like Pico: a personal computer or laptop, a
smartphone, maybe even a car or motorbike. Without lack
of generality we shall however retain the ‘Pico’ and
‘Picosibling’ model and terminology, since our project
approaches these issues in a relatively pure and
uncomplicated way.
Variable weightings
The mapping of shares to Picosiblings does not need to
be a simple one-to-one relationship: different Picosiblings
may have different ‘weights’. If you always wear your
watch, and nobody else ever wears it, then it is a very
good indicator of your presence, and may be allocated a
larger number of the shares required to unlock the Pico.
A subcutaneous implant might be given even more, while
something that you regularly leave at home or in the car
might only have one share.
In the Pico project, there is a very specific example of
when different weightings can be useful. The information
stored on your Pico device can be backed up elsewhere
and, in the event of the Pico being lost, stolen or
damaged, the backups can be restored to a new device.
But the backups are encrypted in the same way as the
data on the original Pico, so can only be decoded in the
presence of a suitable number of Picosiblings. What
happens if the Picosiblings, or a significant subset of
them, have also been lost? To plan for this, you can grant
a single Picosibling sufficient shares that it could,
singlehandedly, unlock your Pico, and then deposit that
Picosibling in a safe at your bank or with a trustworthy
friend. In the event that you lose all your other worldly
possessions, you can still restore an encrypted backup
onto a blank new Pico and then use this special
Picosibling to unlock the restored Pico and recover access
to your credentials, as well as the ability to redefine a new
set of Picosiblings.
Dynamic shares
Different Picosibling devices, then, can be given different
levels of intrinsic importance. But the number of shares
represented by a device could also depend on other
factors, and might be dynamic, rather than being a fixed
value that is either present or absent. Dynamically-varying
numbers of shares can be used to give a more reliable
assessment of the likelihood that the user is present.
Proximity is the first and most obvious example. If an
estimate of the Pico-to-sibling range is available (based
either on radio signal strength for a low-cost and
low-energy example, or on more sophisticated
distance-bounding technology for higher security), the
system might use one share from a sibling which is
moderately close, and two from one known to be much
closer.
Ideally, this would be determined by each Picosibling, not
by the Pico: when asked, the Picosibling only surrenders a
number of shares corresponding to the proximity of the
Pico that was asking. If Picosiblings are very dumb or
passive devices, similar to RFID tags, the distinction could
be provided by simple electronics. The sibling might be
queried twice by the Pico, using two different radio
frequencies, or two different power levels. Higher
frequencies would normally degrade faster with distance
and obstructions, and so could only return a share when
the Pico was closer at hand. Passive Picosiblings which
harvest power from the radio signal might only be able to
transmit a number of shares dependent on the energy
they had captured. These techniques are open to simple
attacks from those able to boost the radio signals, of
course, so should be taken as an illustration rather than
an implementation suggestion, but they might still be
appropriate for certain low-cost, less-critical scenarios.
More sophisticated Picosibling devices may also use the
number of shares to indicate their own level of ‘comfort’
based on other factors:
• A Picosibling incorporating a biometric sensor might
release multiple shares when confident of a good
match, but fewer when it is less certain.
• A Picosibling normally worn on the body might stop
giving out shares when it becomes completely
stationary for a minute or so — usually an
indication that the wearer has taken it off. A more
sophisticated strategy might be to give out no
shares when the device is stationary, one when it
senses movement, and more shares, depending on
confidence, when it recognizes the wearer to be the
legitimate owner [6].
• A device that detects a particular geographic
location may give up a number of shares dependent
not only on its location, but also on the quality of
the GPS signal received.
• Some Picosiblings may be happier when in the
presence of particular WiFi networks, indicating that
they are in a familiar location.
In addition, some Picosiblings may need to be ‘comforted’
from time to time:
• A device incorporating a fingerprint reader may be
willing to assert that the user is there, but only for a
limited period since the last fingerprint scan.
• A device may need to contact a server periodically,
to check that its authorisation to expose its shares
has not been revoked. We use this strategy in our
project to be able to remotely disable a lost or
stolen Pico [12].
• Such time-dependent checks might also be
expressed as a confidence level — a number of
shares — which decays over a period: the proximity
in time of a Picosibling’s last check being
comparable to the use of its proximity in space
discussed above.
Some of these ideas are open to individual attacks, but
the nature of these combinatorial systems is such that an
attacker would typically have to employ multiple
simultaneous approaches to be successful.1
1We have also tended to use optimistic language here, stating that
a Picosibling may be willing to release more shares because it feels
comfortable; it is just as valid to describe it as unwilling to release its
normal complement of shares in a context when it feels threatened,
thus providing greater security than a na¨ıve k-of-n system.
Presence arithmetic
We can extend these ideas of variable and
dynamically-changing numbers of shares by building more
complicated expressions to detect user presence, based on
real-world habits.
There are situations, for example, where the whole
environment may be worth more than the sum of its parts.
My car, and my wristwatch, may each be worth one share
on their own. But if my watch is in my car, that’s
arguably a much greater indication that I am there too,
and might warrant more than simple addition — this
combination may be worth three or four shares rather than
two. One way to accomplish this would be to split some
shares in two and give one half of each share to each
Picosibling: only when both are present can the shares be
reconstructed and used. An alternative system might have
the car also detect the proximity of the watch, and release
more shares if the former can see the latter. Picos may
not be the only things that need a ‘comfort zone’ - that
concept could be extended to the Picosiblings.2
The opposite is also possible: danger zones. These are
higher-risk situations in which a Pico should feel less
comfortable than normal. Your suitcase could have a
negative share, meaning that you need a larger number of
Picosiblings when travelling in its presence than you might
at home. A criminal baggage-handler finding a suitcase
with Picosiblings in it would also then have a harder time
using them. A restriction that depends on the presence of
2As a thought experiment, we might assume that Picos and Pi-
cosiblings are fundamentally the same, and extend the hierarchy both
up and down. Some Picosiblings might need comfort zones, when
k other ‘SubPicosiblings’ are nearby, and, going upwards, we might
imagine a life-support machine incorporating a SuperPico so that it
can only be switched off when the Picos of k other family members
are in the vicinity.
a negative influence will often be weak, because a
knowledgeable attacker may find it easy simply to remove
that influence, for example by tipping the contents out of
the suitcase. But it does reduce the likelihood that
somebody who gets hold of your Pico by picking your
pocket in the check-in queue will then be able to use it
simply by standing close to you. Negative shares can also
be dynamic: your car might start to emit them if it knew
it was in a less salubrious part of your town.
Implementing a negative-share system (a challenge to the
cryptographers in the audience) requires that the code
and execution environment on the Pico be trusted, to
ensure that all negative shares are taken into account and
not simply ignored, but this is already necessary for
several other aspects of the system.
In general, there is an assumption that communications
between the Pico and siblings are suitably protected;
Peeters’s dissertation [7] discusses relevant cryptographic
protocols. Once such protocols are extended to handle
negative shares, attackers should not be able to
distinguish negative from positive shares, otherwise they
could attempt to silence or hide the negative ones.
Additionally, Picosibling hardware must incorporate
enough tamper-resistance to resist cloning.
Classes of shares
Modelling human habits even more realistically may require
greater subtlety than can be achieved simply by adding up
plusses and minuses. Consider, for example, the case of a
fashion-conscious celebrity with hundreds of pairs of shoes.
A shoe might be an excellent place to embed a Picosibling,
but few people will be wearing more than two of them at
any one time. The number of shares accessible to a burglar
entering the celebrity’s wardrobe might therefore be
hundreds of times the number needed to unlock their Pico.
Various solutions can be suggested for this: shoes which
will release their shares only when a foot of the right size
is wearing them, for example, or when a human of the
correct weight is standing in them.
But a more general solution would be for Picosiblings to
be divided into ‘classes’. For a particular user, the classes
might include footwear, jewellery, millinery, gadgets, and
implants. A surfeit of shares in one class would have no
effect if shares from the other classes were missing: all the
shoes in the world are of no use if you don’t have a
suitable tiara to go with them, and tiaras are kept in the
safe, not the wardrobe.
We can model this quite nicely with the secret-sharing
ideas as well, by adopting a two-stage process. First, the
master key needed to unlock the Pico’s credentials is split
into m shares, one for each class, such that the shares
from j-of-m classes are needed to recreate it. (We may
not need to insist on an item from every class, just a
reasonable subset.) Then, each of those class-specific
shares is split up in the same way such that kC of nC of
these sub-shares are needed to reconstruct the share for
class C.
We can then require, for example, any combination of
three of the following sets: {two shoes}, {one hat}, {one
phone}, {three items of jewellery}.
Conclusion
We have shown how ‘something you have’ can be
extended to ‘several things you have’ and then, through
secret-sharing, to more sophisticated models of user
presence by considering variable numbers of shares,
dynamically-adjusted numbers of shares, negative shares,
and classes of shares.
It remains to be seen which combinations of real-world
situations should map onto Pico comfort zones or danger
zones, and then whether the components described above
are useful ways of modelling these. Such a system may
also become very user-specific, which is not a problem if
the user is willing and able to understand its operation.
But can we generalise such models to provide a useful
default template configuration for certain classes of user,
and if so, how would those classes be defined? By gender
or generation, by culture or nationality, by level of
expertise, or perhaps by occupation?
Location privacy will need to be protected. The
specification for the Picosiblings protocol [12, section 4.1]
requires that eavesdroppers be unable to infer long-term
pseudonyms, but it won’t be trivial for actual
implementations to provide this feature.
Another challenge, as we make a more complex and
secure system, is whether we can also make it
understandable. The Pico system’s increased security and
general ease of use may be of little consolation to
somebody locked out of their house in the small hours of
the morning just because they left their tiara in a taxi,
especially if they don’t understand why that was the
critical factor. We must not only represent user behaviour
with such a system, but also provide a good mental model
of how we do so, and communicate that effectively [9].
There are opportunities for valuable psychological and
ethnographic user studies to be done in this area, but the
underlying k-of-n model — being easily pictured in terms
of having ‘enough letters to guess the word’, or ‘sufficient
jigsaw pieces to see the picture’, or ‘at least three of the
starship’s officers present to initiate the auto-destruct
sequence’ — may be easier for users to grasp than some
other systems, at least if we don’t go overboard with
hierarchical levels of classes of shares. Usability will,
however, always be crucial and this is why in our project
all design ideas are subject to validation through user
studies. We like inventing innovative and potentially more
secure schemes, but we’ll only carry them through to the
next stage if the prototypes we build and test on
non-geeks convince us that they actually make life easier
for regular humans.
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